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BABY YOU CAN DRIVE MY CAR: RETHINKING GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AND GREEN MOUNTAIN CHRYSLER 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Few things are as ubiquitous and necessary in modern American culture as 
the automobile.1  It would seem unthinkable looking back over the past 
hundred years that industrial advancement would reach a point where one car 
would account globally for every ten people.2  This trend is even more striking 
when we consider that as of 2002, North America’s car concentration 
approaches forty-five cars for every one hundred people.3 
Further alarming is the fact that while estimates vary, general scientific 
consensus now recognizes that with increased motor vehicle usage comes 
greater carbon dioxide emissions,4 a contributing factor significantly 
responsible for the global warming phenomenon.5  This phenomenon should 
 
 1. SASI GROUP & MARK NEWMAN, PASSENGER CARS (2006) (“. . . [T]he car still defines a 
lifestyle.  Americans still buy cars by the millions, whether they are in gridlocked LA or in the 
middle of Kansas miles from the nearest town.” (quoting Paul Harris)), available at 
http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/worldmapper/posters/worldmapper_map31_ver5.pdf. 
 2.  Id. (stating that as of 2002 there 590 million cars in the world, amounting to one for 
every ten people). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2000) (Congressional findings that “the growth in the 
amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development, 
and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health 
and welfare, including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration 
of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation.”).  See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 
U.S. 497, 523–27 (2007) (“Considering just emissions from the transportation sector, which 
represent less than one-third of this country’s total carbon dioxide emissions, the United States 
would still rank as the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world, outpaced only by the 
European Union and China.”);  Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 
17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. 
Supp. 2d 295, 339 (D. Vt. 2007) (“. . . [T]he control and reduction of emissions of greenhouse 
gases are critical to slow the effects of global warming, and that passenger vehicles and light-duty 
trucks are responsible for some forty percent of the total greenhouse gas pollution in 
[California].”). 
 5. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504 (“A well-documented rise in global temperatures has 
coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. 
Respected scientists believe the two trends are related.”). 
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cause further alarm considering the current prevalence and upward trend of 
automobile usage in the United States.6 
Increased awareness of the significant environmental, social, and economic 
problems global warming poses for our nation has provided many states with 
reason to take a more active role in limiting their own automobile Greenhouse 
Gas (“GHG”) emissions.7  States seek this goal in a variety of ways, including 
regulatory actions, litigation, and membership in regional GHG initiatives.8  
California has been foremost among these states, and has long been considered 
a leader in enacting aggressive environmental GHG regulations.9 
In recent years, however, progress achieved by California and other states 
has faced significant challenges. Automobile manufacturers have recently 
brought multiple suits throughout the country alleging that state attempts at 
automobile GHG emissions regulation are preempted by federal environmental 
legislation.10  As such, California and other states’ progress will be illusory if 
automobile manufacturers sway the courts to accept their federal preemption 
challenges.  Recent trial court decisions in California and Vermont, however, 
seem to offer hope that these state regulatory actions can withstand challenges 
of federal preemption.11  Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,12 authoritatively recognizing global warming for the 
first time as a pressing national problem,13 likely paves the way for future state 
efforts to actively reduce their own GHG emissions. 
 
 6. See U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY 
ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS Table 1-11 (2008) (showing an 
increase in total highway registered vehicles between 2004 and 2006 from 243,010,549 to 
250,851,833), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/pdf/ 
entire.pdf. 
 7. See J. Jared Snyder, Global Warming Litigation: State and Citizens v. Federal 
Government and Industry, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 255, 255 (2006). 
 8. Id. at 255–56. 
 9. Richard Simon & Janet Wilson, EPA Denies California’s Right to Mandate Emissions, 
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2007) at 2 (stating that “California has frequently chartered the course the 
country has followed” (quoting William K. Reilly)), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/ 
printededition/front/la-me-epa20dec20,1,6015795.story. 
 10. Of particular note for current discussion are the two recent district court cases coming 
out of Vermont and California, Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 
F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 
1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007).  An additional suit, Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224 
(D.R.I. 2008), was recently decided in Rhode Island. 
 11. See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 295.  See also Central Valley, 529 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1151. 
 12. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 13. See Joshua Steinberg, Note, The Bone-Chilling Effects of Global Warming and the 
EPA’s Cold-Shoulder Response to Pleas for Help, A Case Note on Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 
F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 169, 188 (2007). 
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This note will first discuss the history and content of the Clean Air Act 
(“CAA”), highlighting the broad and longstanding congressional deference 
afforded to California to more strictly regulate GHG emissions.  Next, the note 
will discuss the Environmental Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”), 
focusing on how—unlike the CAA—it expressly preempts any state from 
enacting regulations “relating to fuel economy.”14  The note then briefly 
describes California Assembly Bill 1493 (“AB 1493”), the formidable GHG 
emissions legislation that has led many states to follow its path, and affected 
current preemption litigation.  The note will then move to explore recent 
environmental jurisprudence that seeks to reconcile the seemingly conflicting 
statutory mandates of the CAA and EPCA.  The fact that virtually all means of 
regulating GHG motor vehicle emissions relate, in some way, to fuel economy 
make this conflict significant and readily apparent.15  Finally, the note will 
argue that the recent decisions in Massachusetts, Green Mountain Chrysler, 
and Central Valley Chrysler together represent a marked shift in how the 
judicial branch views global warming, and have—at least initially—vindicated 
the rights of states pushing for more stringent GHG emission standards.  The 
author adds that this note assumes the issuance of an EPA waiver for 
California, as will be discussed below.  The CAA preempts any state 
enforcement of GHG emissions standards unless and until California receives 
an EPA waiver for the standards they have promulgated.16 
II.  THE CLEAN AIR ACT—CALIFORNIA’S BROAD GRANT OF CONGRESSIONAL 
AUTHORITY 
In terms of U.S. environmental policy, the 1960s saw an unprecedented 
national awareness of air pollution and focus on forming a national solution.17  
Indeed, Congress’s 1963 passage of the CAA brought about a much more 
expansive stance in addressing air pollution on a national scale.18  The CAA 
vested authority in the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to establish 
standards for air pollutants emitted from new motor vehicles—pollutants that, 
in the EPA’s judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution likely to endanger 
 
 14. See infra Section III. 
 15. See Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (accepting as proven the proposition that 
regulations requiring substantial reduction of carbon dioxide emissions will necessarily require 
substantial increases in motor vehicle fuel efficiency). 
 16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000). 
 17. Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Comment, California’s Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel 
Economy Preemption Curb California’s Air Pollution Leadership?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893, 899 
(2003). 
 18. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1164. 
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public health or welfare.19  The EPA accomplishes this goal by establishing 
national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”),20 which set the maximum 
allowable discharge level for ambient air pollutants considered harmful to 
public health or welfare.21  The plan also requires all states to submit a state 
implementation plan (“SIP”) for EPA approval, highlighting how the state 
plans to reduce or maintain the concentration of air pollution necessary in 
order to meet current NAAQS.22 
Section 209(a) of the CAA preempts all states from adopting automobile 
emissions regulations, providing that “[n]o State or any political 
subdivision . . . shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the 
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines 
subject to this part.”23 It bears mentioning, however, that the original 
enactment of the CAA contained no preemption provision,24 an absence that 
reflects Congress’s understanding that air pollution regulation was a task 
necessitating cooperative efforts from both the states and the federal 
government.25 
Section 209(a) preemption is qualified, however, by a waiver found in 
subsection (b).26  A waiver may be granted by the EPA—provided certain 
criteria are met—for “any state which has adopted standards . . . for the control 
of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to 
 
 19. Section 7521(a)(1) provides, in part, that “[t]he Administrator shall by regulation 
prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this Section, 
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor 
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air 
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 
 20. § 7408(a)(1). 
 21. § 7408(a)(1)(A).  See Deborah Keeth, The California Climate Law: A State’s Cutting-
Edge Efforts to Achieve Clean Air, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715, 723 (2003). 
 22. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 525 (2d 
Cir. 1994); Keeth, supra note 21, at 723.   
 23. § 7543(a).  See also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 526 (“The cornerstone of 
Title II is Congress’ continued express preemption of state regulation of automobile emissions.”). 
 24. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 303 
(D. Vt. 2007). 
 25. Id. at 303 n.6.  See § 7401(a)(3)–(4) (“that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction 
or elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the 
source) and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local 
governments . . . that Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for the development 
of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air pollution.”).  
See also Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 899 (“Through both the [Air Quality Act] and its successor 
the Clean Air Act, the federal approach to air pollution control has maintained this high degree of 
dependence on state cooperation, principally through reliance on state adoption and enforcement 
of State Implementation Plans. . . .”). 
 26. § 7543(b). 
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March 30, 1966.”27  Since only California had the foresight to regulate new 
motor vehicle emissions prior to March 30, 1966, it is the only state entitled to 
waiver consideration by the EPA.28  California’s long-standing commitment to 
environmental regulation, coupled with the unique problems that GHG 
emissions pose for the state’s climate, make that state an appropriate candidate 
for waiver of federal preemption.29  Further, excepting California from general 
preemption represents a compromise between the states’ traditional role in 
regulating motor vehicle emissions and automobile manufacturers’ desire to 
avoid the economic disruption that would likely result from having to meet 
fifty-one separate sets of emissions control requirements.30 
California thus holds a unique position as a regulatory leader among the 
states,31 leading some to suggest that California’s role in environmental 
regulation should be viewed not as an example of traditional cooperative 
federalism, but rather as one of “modified federalism.”32  Under such a view 
the federal government establishes an innovative connection with an individual 
state rather than the states collectively, thus creating a relationship that fosters 
enhanced innovation for that locality.33 
To grant a waiver, the EPA must find that California’s standards are at 
least as protective as existing federal standards “in the aggregate.”34  Further, 
the EPA may only deny a California waiver application if the regulations 
California seeks to adopt are “arbitrary and capricious,” if they are not needed 
 
 27. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 526 n.2 (citing § 7543(b)(1)). 
 28. Id. at 525. 
 29. See Keeth, supra note 21, at 723 (stating that congressional approval for the exception 
was appropriate given California’s “unique problems” as well as their pioneering efforts to 
control motor vehicle air pollution).  See also Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 283 (2003) (stating that California’s 
regulatory leadership has been responsible for catalytic converters, low-emission vehicles, 
unleaded gasoline and other technologies); Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 900 (“Within this 
cooperative approach to air pollution, no state was more instrumental to the formulation of 
national air pollution policy than California.”). 
 30. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing 
the debate “between the states, which wanted to preserve their traditional role in regulating motor 
vehicles, and the manufacturers, which wanted to avoid the economic disruption latent in having 
to meet fifty-one separate sets of emissions control requirements,” and emphasizing the 
“compromise” that subsection (b) provided). 
 31. See Michael H. Wall, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California Assembly 
Bill 1493: Filling the American Greenhouse Gas Regulation Void, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 567, 577 
(2007) (characterizing California as a “figurehead of progressive environmental legislation . . .”). 
 32. See Carlson, supra note 29, at 284. 
 33. Id. at 285 (arguing that California’s special regulatory role has increased the states’ 
bureaucratic expertise in mobile source technology, has allowed for innovative policy proposals, 
and has concentrated innovation geographically by promoting mobile source firms within 
California). 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2000). 
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to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” or if the standards and 
accompanying enforcement procedures the state employs are otherwise 
inconsistent with section 7521(a) of the CAA.35  California’s satisfaction of 
these three requirements obliges the EPA to grant their waiver request.36  
Indeed the House Report accompanying the 1997 CAA amendments 
demonstrates the wide discretion Congress intended to afford California 
through this waiver: 
The Administrator . . . is not to overturn California’s judgment lightly. Nor is 
he to substitute his judgment for that of the State.  There must be clear and 
compelling evidence that the State acted unreasonably in evaluating the 
relative risks of various pollutants in light of the air quality, topography, 
photochemistry, and climate in that State, before [the] EPA may deny a 
waiver.37 
Moreover, if such a deferential reading were in doubt, the Court’s recent 
decision in Massachusetts lends more support for a finding that California 
satisfies the “compelling and extraordinary conditions” waiver prong, leading 
one analyst to say that: 
[T]he global distribution of greenhouse gas emissions may present a novel 
challenge to California’s ability to obtain a section 209(b) waiver.  California’s 
coastline is threatened by climate change in much the same way as that of 
other states, precisely Massachusetts’ stated injury in Massachusetts v. EPA.  
Uncertainty regarding the impact of climate change on weather events impedes 
a determination that California, more than other states, will feel a 
disproportionate burden due to greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles.38 
Subsequent CAA amendments further bolstered congressional support and 
deference for California.39  To wit, the 1977 CAA amendments provided that 
the EPA, when reviewing a California waiver application, must consider 
 
 35. Id. (“No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that— 
(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious, 
(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary 
conditions, or 
(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent 
with section 7521(a) of this title.”). 
 36. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1171 (E.D. Cal. 
2007). 
 37. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 903 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 302 (1977), reprinted 
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1381). 
 38. Matthew Visick, If Not Now, When? The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006: California’s Final Steps Toward Comprehensive Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Regulations, 
13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 249, 266–67 (2007). 
 39. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 901 (“Congress reaffirmed its unique blessing upon 
California through numerous amendments to the CAA.”). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] BABY YOU CAN DRIVE MY CAR 565 
California’s standards “in the aggregate,”40 a change that provides California 
increased flexibility by allowing the state to establish the protectiveness of 
their proposed standards as a package rather than standard-by-standard.41 
The very same amendments also brought the addition of section 177, a 
provision allowing other states to adopt California standards once California 
receives a formal EPA waiver.42  This so called “piggyback” provision allows 
other states to implement California’s standards if that state’s standards “are 
identical to the California standards for which a waiver has been granted for 
such model year.”43  In an effort to allay automobile industry timing fears, the 
waiver further employs a lead time requirement, providing that other states 
may adopt California’s identical standards for which a waiver has been granted 
if “California and such State adopt such standards at least two years before 
commencement of such model year.”44  Presently seventeen states have 
adopted California’s GHG motor vehicle emission standards by way of section 
177.45  The aggregate effect of these states amounts to one third of the national 
passenger vehicle market.46  Thus, the continuing vitality of California’s 
standards has pressing significance not only for California but for numerous 
other states and the country as a whole. 
Finally, the history of California’s previous waiver requests demonstrates 
the deferential position held by the state.47  California has made at least ninety-
five waiver requests under section 209(b), with about half involving new or 
 
 40. Id. at 902.  See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 17 
F.3d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 41. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 902.  See also Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 
627 F.2d 1095, 1110–11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The history of congressional consideration of the 
California waiver provision, from its original enactment up through 1977, indicates that Congress 
intended the State to continue and expand its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor 
vehicle emission standards different from and in large measure more advanced than the 
corresponding federal program; in short, to act as a kind of laboratory for innovation. Had 
Congress wanted to limit California’s role to forbid its adoption of any program comparable to 
the federal scheme in section 207, it could have easily done so. It did not. For a court to do so 
despite the absence of such an indication would only frustrate the congressional intent.”). 
 42. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 525. 
 43. Id. (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat. 
685, 750 (1977)). 
 44. 42 U.S.C. § 7507(2) (2008). 
 45. Justin R. Pidot, Global Warming in the Courts: An Overview of Current Litigation and 
Common Legal Issues, GEO. ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y INST., 1, 15 (2006). 
 46. ARIZONA PIRG EDUCATION FUND, 2007 EPA WAIVER HEARING ON CALIFORNIA 
STATE MOTOR VEHICLE POLLUTION CONTROL STANDARDS 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.arizonapirg.org/uploads/2h/rH/2hrHlVnZ25HArXBuB6guJw/Background-On-CAs-
EPA-Waiver.pdf. 
 47. JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CALIFORNIA’S 
WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT, CRS-11-12 
(2007), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Nov/RL34099.pdf. 
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amended standards.48  Of all such requests, the EPA has granted all in whole or 
in part.49  The EPA’s record of deference and the CAA amendments discussed 
above, both evidence Congress’s declaration with letting California “blaze its 
own trail.”50  In sum, the exemption California holds and other states’ 
leadership in regulating GHG emissions has resulted in many technological 
advances,51 and California’s regulatory role has led other states to follow its 
lead.52 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at CRS-12.  See also Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 903 (“In practice, California's 
waiver applications are almost always approved.”). 
 50. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 903 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d 1293, 1297 
(D.C. Cir. 1979)). 
 51. See Carlson, supra note 29, at 283 (arguing that California's leadership regulating mobile 
source pollution was responsible for numerous technological advancements, including the 
catalytic converter, low-emission vehicles, and unleaded gasoline).  See also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n 
v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Given the indications before Congress that 
California's regulatory proposals for nonroad sources were ahead of the EPA's development of its 
own proposals and the Congressional history of permitting California to enjoy coordinate 
regulatory authority over mobile sources with the EPA, the decision to identify California as the 
lead state is comprehensible. California has served for almost 30 years as a “laboratory” for motor 
vehicle regulation. . . .  Its severe air pollution problems, diverse industrial and agricultural base, 
and variety of climatic and geographical conditions suit it well for a similar role with respect to 
nonroad sources.”); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 
295, 398 (D. Vt. 2007) (“Through amendments to the CAA, Congress has essentially designated 
California as a proving ground for innovation in emissions control regulations.”). 
 52. At the time of this writing seventeen states have—or have publicly committed to—
enacting California’s more restrictive GHG emissions standards.  The states include: Arizona 
(Gov. Janet Napolitano, Exec. Order No. 2006-13, 12 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 3389–90 (Sept. 15–16), 
available at http://www.azsos.gov/aar/2006/37/governor.pdf), Colorado (GOV. BILL RITTER, JR., 
COLORADO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN: A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS GLOBAL WARMING, (2007), 
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/COClimatePlan.pdf), Connecticut (2004 
Conn. Acts 84, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/act/Pa/2004PA-00084-R00SB-00119-
PA.htm), Florida (Gov. Charlie Christ, Exec. Order 07-127, available at http://www.flclimate 
change.us/ewebeditpro/items/O12F15074.pdf), Massachusetts (Press Release, Mass. Dep’t of 
Envtl Protection, Massachusetts Enacts Strict New Vehicle Emissions Standards (Jan. 9, 2006), 
available at http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/cleanairact/docs/Mass_Dept_of_ 
Env_Protection.pdf), Maine (Maine Dep’t of Envtl Protection, New Motor Vehicle Emission 
Standards, 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 127, available at http://www.maine.gov/dep/air/regulations/ 
docs/chap127final.pdf), Maryland (Maryland Clean Cars Act of 2007, 2007 Md. Laws ch. 111 
(passed as S.B. 103)), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2007RS/chapters_noln/Ch_111_ 
sb0103E.pdf), New Jersey (N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:2C-8.15–8.17 (2009)), New Mexico (Gov. Bill 
Richardson, Exec. Order 2006-69, available at http://www.governor.state.nm.us/press/2006/dec/ 
122806_01.pdf), New York (Greenhouse Gas Exhaust Emissions Standards, N.Y. COMP. CODES 
R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 218-8 (2009), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/regs/4243.html), Oregon 
(Oregon Low Emission Vehicles, OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-257-0010 (2009), available at 
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARs_300/OAR_340/340_257.html), Pennsylvania 
(Pennsylvania Clean Vehicles Program, 25 PA. CODE § 126.401 (2009), available at 
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III.  THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT—FEDERALLY 
MANDATED FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS AND EXPRESS PREEMPTION OF 
REGULATIONS ‘RELATED TO FUEL ECONOMY’ 
Congress enacted the EPCA in 1975, as a comprehensive response to the 
1973 energy crisis.53  Seeking to enhance the supply of fossil fuels through 
increased production and energy conservation programs, the Act’s main thrust 
involved the establishment of a system of mandatory corporate average fuel 
economy (“CAFE”) standards.54  The EPCA empowers the Department of 
Transportation (“DOT”) to set federal fuel economy standards for new fleets of 
passenger automobiles,55 an authority the Secretary has delegated to the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator (“NHTSA”).56 CAFE 
standards require any new automobile fleet to meet a minimum corporate 
average fuel economy that must be set at the “maximum feasible average fuel 
economy level.”57  In determining this level the NHTSA must consider (1) 
technological feasibility; (2) economic practicability; (3) the effect of other 
motor vehicle standards of the government on fuel economy; and (4) the need 
of the United States to conserve energy.”58 
Unlike the CAA, however, which provides California with the possibility 
of a waiver of preemption, the EPCA expressly preempts all states from 
attempting to regulate fuel economy.59 
The EPCA preemption provision was adopted in order to maintain fuel 
economy standards throughout the country.60  Specifically, the provision 
provides: 
 
http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/025/chapter126/subchapDtoc.html), Rhode Island (Rhode 
Island’s Low Emission Vehicles Program, 12-031-037 R.I. CODE R. § 37.2.1 (2009), available at 
http://www.dem.ri.gov/pubs/regs/regs/air/air37_07.pdf), Utah (Western Climate Initiative, 
Statement of Regional Goal, tbl. 1 (Aug. 22, 2007), available at http://www.azclimate 
change.gov/download/082207_statement.pdf), Vermont (12-031-001 VT. CODE R. § 5-1103(a) 
(2009), available at http://www.anr.state.vt.us/air/docs/apcregs.pdf), and Washington (WASH. 
REV. CODE § 70.120A.010 (2009), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite= 
70.120A.010).  See also Wall, supra note 31 at 577; Carlson, supra note 29, at 302 (“The state’s 
regulatory privileges carry weight beyond the state’s borders: any state with an approved state 
implementation plan for a non-attainment area may adopt California motor vehicle standards.”).   
 53. General Motors Corp. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 166–67 
(D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 54. Id. at 167.  See Keeth, supra note 21, at 724–25. 
 55. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2000).  See also Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 
F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
 56. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1.5(f) (2008)). 
 57. § 32902(a). 
 58. § 32902(f).  See also Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1157. 
 59. § 32919(a).  See also Visick, supra note 38, at 268. 
 60. See Sara A. Colangelo, The Politics of Preemption: An Application of Preemption 
Jurisprudence and Policy to California Assembly Bill 1493, 37 ENVTL. L. 175, 183 (2007) 
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[W]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under the chapter is in 
effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a 
law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy 
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under 
this chapter.61 
It may come as no surprise that much recent and pending litigation in this 
area seeks to address the issue of how we reconcile the EPCA’s express 
preemption provision over regulations “related to fuel economy standards” 
with the CAA’s long-standing commitment to allowing California the ability to 
regulate GHG emissions at a level more stringent than the EPA, provided they 
receive an EPA waiver.62  While the states’ ability to regulate mobile source 
air pollution finds ample support within the CAA, only recently have courts 
begun to grapple with the question of whether and to what extent California’s 
CAA authority to regulate mobile source GHG emissions—and, resultantly, 
other states’ ability to adopt the same—is consistent with EPCA’s express 
waiver provision.63 However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in 
Massachusetts v. EPA,64 as well as district court decisions in Vermont and 
California,65 all seem to provide considerable flexibility and support for 
California to more stringently regulate GHG emissions—and for other states to 
adopt the same regulations by way of the CAA piggyback provision. 
IV.  AB 1493: CALIFORNIA’S PROGRESSIVE GLOBAL WARMING LEGISLATION 
Present litigation largely focuses on California AB 1493, a comprehensive 
piece of legislation passed by the state in 2001 as a broad effort to reduce GHG 
emissions from motor vehicles.66  Heralded for its scope, the legislation is 
widely considered the most significant response to global warming at either the 
federal or state level.67  Among its other purposes, AB 1493 requires the 
 
(stating that the broad language of Section 32919 was employed by Congress to allay industry 
concerns, thus preventing a “chaotic compliance regime of varying standards . . .”). 
 61. § 32919(a) (emphasis added). 
 62. Colangelo, supra note 60, at 183 (stating that AB 1493 preemption challenges under the 
EPCA and the CAA illuminate the tension between not subjecting the automobile industry to fifty 
different state standards and the congressional desire for California to continue its leadership as 
the nation's laboratory for air pollution control technology). 
 63. Carlson, supra note 29, at 283 (“Despite the fact that California is exempted from the 
CAA preemption provision codifying California's leadership in regulating mobile source air 
pollution, it remains an open question whether the courts or the federal government will allow the 
state to force technological changes designed to reduce mobile source greenhouse gas 
emissions.”).  See also Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 944. 
 64. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 558–59 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 65. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 66. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 895. 
 67. Id. 
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California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) to “develop and adopt regulations 
that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions from motor vehicles” no later than January 1, 2005.68  The GHG 
emissions reductions CARB establishes must be “[c]apable of being 
successfully accomplished within the time provided . . . taking into account 
environmental, economic, social, and technological factors,”69 and must also 
be “economical to an owner or operator of a vehicle.”70  In formulating these 
standards, the CARB also considers the regulations’ impact on automobile 
industry sales, jobs, and consumers.71  Although its economic analysis is 
limited to the state of California, the CARB examines the very same factors 
that the NHTSA observes in setting a CAFE standard.72 
V.  RESOLVING THE APPARENT PREEMPTION CONFLICT BETWEEN CAA AND 
EPCA 
It should be unsurprising that increased global warming awareness has also 
led to an increase in global warming litigation during the 21st Century.73  
Indeed, one analyst has explained that the increase in global warming litigation 
reflects increased scientific evidence that global warming is a serious 
multifaceted problem, a growing public awareness of the global warming 
issue, and the tendency of public interest groups to enlist the courts as a tool 
for resolution of public controversies.74  And while the Supreme Court’s recent 
Massachusetts decision did not specifically address the question of 
preemption, its recognition of the gravity posed by climate change, as well as 
 
 68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2003). 
 69. § 43018.5(i)(2)(A). 
 70. § 43018.5(i)(2)(B). 
 71. § 43018.5(c)(2) (“Consider the impact the regulations may have on the economy of the 
state, including, but not limited to, all of the following areas: 
(A) The creation of jobs within the state. 
(B) The creation of new businesses or the elimination of existing businesses within the 
state. 
(C) The expansion of businesses currently doing business within the state. 
(D) The ability of businesses in the state to compete with businesses in other states. 
(E) The ability of the state to maintain and attract businesses in communities with the 
most significant exposure to air contaminants, localized air contaminants, or both, 
including, but not limited to, communities with minority populations or low-income 
populations, or both. 
(F) The automobile workers and affiliated businesses in the state.”).   
See also Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 
337 (D. Vt. 2007). 
 72. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 338. 
 73. Pidot, supra note 45, at 1. 
 74. Id. 
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the Court’s analysis of the interplay between the CAA and EPCA, has 
persuaded federal district courts recently addressing the preemption question.75 
A. Massachusetts v. EPA—Overlapping Statutory Mandates not Mutually 
Exclusive 
Massachusetts v. EPA was brought by a group of citizens, states, and local 
governments, alleging that in light of well-documented evidence of global 
warming, the EPA had abdicated its responsibility under the CAA by refusing 
to regulate greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide.76  Alternatively, the 
EPA contended that it lacked authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse 
gases.77  A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA had properly 
exercised its discretion, while lacking agreement as to whether the parties had 
standing.78 Judge Randolph’s opinion found that the EPA’s substantial 
discretion, as well as the many policy considerations the agency must consider 
in reaching a non-regulatory decision, both supported a finding that the EPA 
properly exercised its discretion.79 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of whether the EPA 
had authority to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under 
section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, and further, whether the EPA may refuse to 
issue such standards based on policy considerations.80  As a threshold matter, 
the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge EPA’s failure to 
regulate.81  Article III standing requires a plaintiff to establish (1) “injury in 
fact”—an invasion of a legally protected concrete and particularized interest, 
(2) a causal connection between the injury and the complained of conduct, and 
(3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.82  The Court found that the harms associated 
with climate change are recognized and serious,83 and the fact that climate 
 
 75. See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 309–10.  See also Central Valley 
Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165–66 (E.D. Cal. 2007). 
 76. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007). 
 77. Id. at 1450. 
 78. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 
F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). 
 79. Id.  But see Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 67–73 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that EPA 
ignored the plain statutory language of the CAA without explanation, which defined “air 
pollutant” so broadly as to include “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, 
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted 
into or otherwise enters the ambient air”. . . citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000)). 
 80. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
 81. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–27. 
 82. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
 83. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (“Indeed, the NRC Report itself—which EPA regards as 
an ‘objective and independent assessment of the relevant science,’—identifies a number of 
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concerns are “widely shared” did not minimize Massachusetts’ interest for 
purposes of standing.84 
While the EPA urged that the relief sought by petitioners would not 
realistically mitigate global climate change,85 the Court instead found that 
regulatory challenges should not be dismissed solely because they work 
incrementally,86 stressing instead that “agencies, like legislatures, do not 
generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop . . . [but] 
instead whittle away at them over time, refining their preferred approach as 
circumstances change and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of 
how best to proceed.”87  Thus, that a regulatory action might be a tentative first 
step did not mean it lacked redressability.88  In sum, the Court held that a 
plaintiff need not show that a favorable decision will relieve every injury, but 
only that it would relieve some discrete injury to himself.89 
On the merits, the Court had little trouble finding that the EPA did not lack 
the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions,90 noting instead that the 
CAA’s sweeping definition of “any air pollution agent” foreclosed the EPA’s 
narrow reading of their regulatory authority.91  Rather, the expansive definition 
of “air pollutant” that included “any air pollution agent or combination of such 
agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is 
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air”92 on its face embraced any 
 
environmental changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including ‘the global retreat 
of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers and 
lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century relative to the past 
few thousand years. . . .’”). 
 84. Id. at 522 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)). 
 85. Id. at 524 (“EPA overstates its case.”). 
 86. Id. (stating that acceptance of such a premise would doom most challenges to regulatory 
action). 
 87. Id. at 525 (“While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by 
itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether 
EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”). 
 88. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523–25. 
 89. Id. at 525–26 (“Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated with 
man-made climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the 
(relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially 
irrelevant.  Nor is it dispositive that developing countries such as China and India are poised to 
increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next century: A reduction in domestic 
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens 
elsewhere.”). 
 90. Id. at 528. 
 91. Id. at 528–29. 
 92. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7606(g) (2000)). 
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type of airborne compound, and further underscored congressional intent 
through repeated use of the word “any.”93 
The Court was likewise not persuaded by the EPA’s argument that it could 
not regulate motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions because doing so would 
require them to tighten mileage requirements, a statutory mandate the EPA 
claimed was congressionally assigned to the DOT.94  That the DOT sets 
mileage standards, the Court maintained, in no way allowed the EPA to “shirk 
its environmental responsibilities.”95  Instead, the EPA’s charge to “protect[] 
the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare,’”96 and the DOT’s directive to promote 
energy efficiency,97 imposed alternative statutory mandates.98  Even though the 
two statutory obligations could at times overlap, that mere possibility, the 
Court found, did not mean the two agencies could not mutually administer 
their obligations.99 
The Court similarly addressed the alternative issue of whether, even after 
establishing statutory authority under the CAA, the EPA could still conclude 
that GHG emissions regulation would be unwise.  The Court found such a 
conclusion at odds with the statutory text of the CAA,100 which provided that 
once the EPA has responded to a rulemaking petition, it may avoid taking 
further action only by determining that greenhouse gases do not contribute to 
climate change, or by providing some reasonable explanation for not 
exercising its discretion.101  Since the EPA offered nothing more than a 
“laundry list of reasons not to regulate,”102 the Court found that it had refused 
to comply with its clear statutory command.103 
The Court’s pronouncement in Massachusetts was generally regarded as a 
substantial victory for environmental advocates, and has been recognized as 
one of the most important environmental decisions in many years.104  Whether 
 
 93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529 n.25 (citing Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 
535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002)). 
 94. Id. at 530–32. 
 95. Id. at 532. 
 96. Id. (citing § 7521(a)(1)). 
 97. Id. (citing § 6201(5)). 
 98. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532. 
 99. Id. (“EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare’ . . . a 
statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency.”). 
 100. Id. (“The alternative basis for EPA’s decision—that even if it does have statutory 
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this time—rests on 
reasoning divorced from the statutory text.”). 
 101. Id. at 533 (“. . . [T]he use of the word ‘judgment’ is not a roving license to ignore the 
statutory text.  It is but a direction to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–55. 
 104. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say EPA Has Power to Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 3, 2007. 
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the EPA promptly decides to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA—an 
unlikely scenario—the decision nonetheless has created a common sense 
discourse regarding global warming.105  Further, in light of California’s 
pending waiver request, commentators viewed the Court’s ruling as also 
placing the state’s request on much firmer ground.106 
While Massachusetts involved the issue of the EPA’s discretion under the 
CAA rather than federal preemption concerns, the Court’s analysis regarding 
the relationship between the CAA and the EPCA has been influential to lower 
courts addressing questions of federal preemption under the EPCA. 
B. Green Mountain Chrysler—Judicial Restraint and Separation of Powers 
Green Mountain Chrysler was brought by various automotive 
manufacturers’ groups seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against 
Vermont’s GHG regulations establishing new automobile emissions 
limitations.107 The plaintiffs asserted that Vermont’s regulations were 
expressly and implicitly preempted both under the EPCA108 and the CAA,109 
presenting the district court with a question of first impression involving the 
degree of interplay between these two expansive federal environmental 
statutes.110  Chief Judge William Sessions authored the court’s opinion.111 
At issue in Green Mountain Chrysler was a comprehensive set of GHG 
emissions regulations adopted by California in 2004,112 which applied to large-
volume motor vehicle manufacturers beginning in 2009, and intermediate and 
small manufacturers in 2016.113  The regulations required decreasing limits for 
manufacturers’ fleet average emissions, expressed in terms of grams of carbon 
dioxide equivalent per mile (gpm).114  While the regulations did not set fuel 
economy standards, they did—like EPCA fuel economy standards—measure 
carbon dioxide emissions.115  California applied for an EPA waiver for these 
regulations in 2005, but EPA’s determination had not yet been made prior to 
 
 105. Erica L. Rancilio, Recent Development, Massachusetts v. EPA, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 
171, 176 (2007). 
 106. MCCARTHY & MELZ, supra note 47, at CRS-14. 
 107. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300 
(D. Vt. 2007). 
 108. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–32919 (2000). 
 109. §§ 7401–7671. 
 110. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302. 
 111. Id. at 299. 
 112. Id. at 302. 
 113. Id. at 341. 
 114. Id. at 342 (“For example, the PC/LDT1 category permits new vehicles to emit a fleet 
average of 323 gpm in model year 2009, decreasing to 205 gpm in model year 2016.  The LDT2 
category permits a fleet average emission of 439 gpm in 2009, decreasing to 332 gpm in 2016.”). 
 115. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 342 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
574 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXVIII:559 
litigation.116  Vermont subsequently adopted California’s 2004 regulations 
pursuant to the CAA section 177 piggyback provision117 as it has been doing 
since 1996.118 
From the outset Chief Judge Sessions emphasized that the preemption 
doctrines did not apply,119 instead framing the case in response to the 
Massachusetts decision.120  Where the Supreme Court in Massachusetts found 
overlap but no conflict between the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse 
gases and NHTSA’s authority under the EPCA to promote energy efficiency 
by setting mileage standards, the question in Green Mountain Chrysler asked 
whether the EPA’s authority to issue a waiver for California standards under 
section 209(b) presented the same “overlap without conflict” scenario.121  
Resolution of this question, the court said, depended on an analysis of 
congressional intent.122 
As to congressional intent, the court found no evidence to indicate that the 
GHG emissions standards were so closely related with fuel economy standards 
as to be expressly preempted.123  Congress likewise did not intend for the 
EPCA’s CAFE standards to exclusively occupy the field of fuel economy, 
since the NHTSA must take into consideration “other federal standards which 
may affect fuel economy.”124 
Although concluding that the preemption doctrine did not apply, the court 
nevertheless conducted federal preemption analysis,125 both because the 
EPCA’s preemption provision appeared literally to forbid enactment of 
Vermont’s regulations, and because their regulations were alleged to actually 
conflict with the EPCA’s fuel economy standards.126 
 
 116. Id. at 302. 
 117. Id. at 302 n.5 (“Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington, in addition to Vermont, have adopted 
California's standards for GHG emissions, pursuant to § 7507.”). 
 118. Id. at 338 (“Vermont first adopted California emissions standards for new motor vehicles 
regulations pursuant to § 177 of the CAA in 1996, when it adopted the LEV program.  Vermont 
adopted California's LEV program because motor vehicles for much of Vermont's air pollution, 
and the California standards required greater pollution reductions than the federal standards.  
Vermont has amended the LEV regulations several times in order to remain consistent with 
California's standards.”). 
 119. Id. at 343–44 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)) (“The 
Supremacy Clause is not implicated when federal laws conflict or appear to conflict with one 
another.  In such a case courts have a duty to give effect to both provisions, if possible.”). 
 120. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 344. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. (citing N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979)). 
 123. Id. at 354. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350. 
 126. Id. 
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Speaking first to conflict preemption, the court was not persuaded that 
plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that the GHG regulations were 
“sufficiently draconian” as to “essentially usurp NHTSA’s prerogative to set 
fuel economy standards.”127  Rather, congressional intent evidenced in multiple 
CAA amendments had been to designate California as a proving ground for 
innovative regulations, more often than not over objections from the 
automobile industry.128  To be sure, the court conceded that the regulations 
presented substantial challenges.129  The court was unconvinced, however, that 
automakers could not meet these challenges, considering the EPA’s authority 
and flexibility to address lead time through the waiver process, as well as the 
industry’s history of compliance with previous technological challenges.130 
In light of the historical tradition of providing the states with primary 
responsibility over mobile source air pollution regulation,131 the court found 
that the EPCA’s preemption provision may not invalidate Vermont’s 
regulations absent clear and manifest congressional purpose to do so.132  In 
rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that Vermont’s regulation merely represented a 
“de facto fuel economy standard,” the court instead found that the regulations 
comprised much more than a “requirement to improve fuel economy, cloaked 
in the rhetoric of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.”133  While there was 
undoubtedly a mathematical relationship between the carbon content of fuel 
and the carbon released, Vermont’s regulations also measure carbon dioxide 
equivalents134 so as to “cover greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.”135  
Thus, the inclusion of emissions that do not correlate with fuel economy 
 
 127. Id. at 398. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id. at 399 
 130. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 399.  (“. . . [A]utomakers describe 
intensive efforts to develop and utilize new technologies to increase fuel efficiency and reduce 
emissions. American automakers are in the vanguard of utilizing hybrid technology to 
dramatically improve fuel economy.  Clean diesel technology is being offered in a growing 
number of vehicles.  Dramatic improvements to powertrain technologies are under study and may 
be available in the not-too-distant future.  Alternative fuels such as ethanol provide another 
strategy for reducing GHG emissions.  The manufacturers have become fully engaged in 
developing these technologies to address emissions concerns, and those efforts are front-and-
center in the public record.  History suggests that the ingenuity of the industry, once put in gear, 
responds admirably to most technological challenges.”). 
 131. Id. at 350 (“. . . Congress acknowledged that the regulation of air pollution from mobile 
sources was traditionally a state responsibility.”). 
 132. Id. at 351 (Congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis.). 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. at 352 (Vermont’s regulation defines “carbon dioxide equivalents” to include 
methane, carbon monoxide and nitrous oxide.). 
 135. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 352. 
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foreclosed plaintiffs’ assertion that the GHG regulation was nothing more than 
a fuel economy standard.136 
The court was likewise worried about construing an already broad 
statutory preemption provision in a way that would—for all practical 
purposes—eliminate the presumption against preemption.137  The court found 
congressional intent instructive on this point in that while the EPCA’s 
objective was undoubtedly to improve automotive efficiency by setting 
uniform fuel economy standards, the legislation was equally drafted against the 
backdrop of other regulations affecting emissions standards, namely the 
CAA.138  The general language of the preemption clause then, when combined 
with an absence of any congressional intent as to its limits—and the specific 
requirement that the EPA take California emissions regulations into 
consideration—all tipped in favor of Congress not clearly intending to preempt 
the Vermont regulations.139  Indeed, this conclusion was even more justified 
because the state regulation being challenged involved the traditional exercise 
of state police power.140 
Many commentators regarded the Green Mountain Chrysler decision as a 
significant victory for states taking an active role in the fight against global 
warming,141 leading some analysts to call the decision “[i]ndisputably . . . a 
major judicial pronouncement on the subject of climate change, and one of the 
most important, recent environmental law decisions generally.”142  
Additionally, since Green Mountain Chrysler was the first decision to validate 
adoption of the California standards, the result is greatly significant for the 
numerous other states that have also adopted the state’s standards by way of 
section 177.143 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 353 (“[I]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest reach of its indeterminacy, 
then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course,” and this would “read the 
presumption against pre-emption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with 
generality.” (citing Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 655 (1995))). 
 138. Id. at 354. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 356. 
 141. Tony Perriello & Carolyn Whetzel, Mobile Sources: Court Backs Vermont Emissions 
Rules Against Challenge Brought by Auto Industry, BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER (Sept. 14, 
2007). 
 142. Richard M. Frank, In Depth: A Very Green Environmental Ruling, From the Green 
State, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.enn.com/ 
business/article/23485. 
 143. Gabrielle Sigel and Allison A. Sapsford, Federal Court Upholds California GHG 
Emissions Standards for New Automobiles, JENNER & BLOCK: CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE (Sept. 
18, 2007) at 3, available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelated 
DocumentsPDFs1252%5C1829%5CFedCourtUpholdsCalGHG.pdf. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2009] BABY YOU CAN DRIVE MY CAR 577 
Indeed, this importance is underscored by the fact that it led eighty-nine 
congressional representatives to write to the EPA, asserting that the opinion 
should guide the EPA’s pending waiver decision.144  The letter urged the EPA 
to make its decision “on the merits, in accordance with the law and the facts of 
this case, which demand you immediately grant California’s waiver, allowing 
California and other states to move forward—ideally in partnership with the 
federal government.”145 
C. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone 
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, like Green Mountain Chrysler, was a 
declaratory judgment action brought by the Association of International 
Automobile Manufacturers (“AIAM”) seeking judicial pronouncement that the 
EPCA preempts the CARB regulations that aim to reduce GHG emissions 
from motor vehicles.146  The case was stayed in anticipation of the pending 
Massachusetts and Green Mountain Chrysler decisions, and the parties 
submitted supplemental briefings on the impact of those decisions on their 
case.147 
From the outset the court found that the implementation of regulations 
requiring substantial reduction in carbon dioxide necessarily required 
substantial increases in motor vehicle fuel efficiency.148  However, AB 1493 
regulations also provided offsets in the computation of carbon dioxide 
emissions for air conditioner improvements and for the ability of vehicles to 
run on alternative fuel formulations that provide lower net carbon emissions.149  
Thus, the court concluded that compliance with California’s AB 1493 
regulations could be at least partially achieved through ways not directly 
proportional to fuel economy mile-per-gallon improvements.150 
The court moved to briefly summarize the Massachusetts and Green 
Mountain Chrysler decisions in an effort to determine whether the decisions 
represented a change in controlling law sufficient to allow reconsideration of 
their prior holdings.151  The court found significant that the Supreme Court had 
considered and rejected EPA’s argument in Massachusetts that carbon dioxide 
 
 144. Dustin Till, Court Upholds State’s Right to Regulate GHG Emissions from New Motor 
Vehicles, MARTEN LAW GROUP ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), available at 
http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20070926-ghg-emissions. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153–54 (E.D. Cal. 
2007). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 1158. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id.  (finding it undisputed that compliance with AB 1493 can be at least partially 
accomplished through changes not directly reflected in mile-per-gallon fuel economy increases.). 
 151. See Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–65. 
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regulation was impossible because it would require infringement of a task 
delegated to the DOT under the EPCA—namely the tightening of mileage 
standards.152  Further indicating the similarity of issues and significance 
between the Massachusetts decision and the instant case, the court went on to 
conclude that: 
The court understands that the issue of preemption was not precisely before the 
Supreme Court because the issues in that case pertained to the authority of one 
agency of the federal government . . . to regulate carbon dioxide emissions 
under the Clean Air Act to the possible detriment of [the] DOT’s aims and 
goals in its administration of [the] EPCA’s CAFE standards program. While 
the preemption doctrine does not apply to the interplay between two federal 
schemes, the inquiry into the conflict between those schemes is similar to 
preemption analysis because both preemption of state law and preclusion of 
 federal statutory remedies are questions of congressional intent.153 
In sum, the court found that Massachusetts represented a change in controlling 
law adequate to allow reconsideration of their September Order.154 
While finding no disagreement with the Green Mountain Chrysler 
conclusion that the preemption doctrine did not apply to the interplay between 
section 209(b) of the CAA and the EPCA, the court employed a somewhat 
different analytical approach, instead starting its analysis with the interplay 
between the regulatory functions of the CAA and the EPCA’s mileage-setting 
authority.155  This three part analysis involved first asking whether the EPA 
may promulgate emission control regulations having an effect on fuel 
economy, further asking whether the EPCA precludes any new EPA-
promulgated regulations that would have the incidental effect of requiring 
greater fuel efficiency, and finally, by answering whether there is any basis for 
treating a regulation granted by state waiver any differently than a regulation 
otherwise promulgated by the EPA.156 
On the first inquiry, the court found that Massachusetts directed their 
threshold inquiry not at the likelihood that California standards would interfere 
with the EPCA’s regulatory scheme, but rather, on the scope of the EPCA’s 
ability to bar regulations aimed at public health and welfare where the 
regulations impact mileage standards.157  Massachusetts was illustrative on this 
point.158  The fact that the CAA specifically mandated that EPA protect the 
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 154. Id. at 1164–65. 
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 156. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1165. 
 157. Id. at 1166. 
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public health and welfare while the EPCA did not do the same for the DOT, 
indicated that Congress empowered the EPA to enact GHG controls despite an 
impact on fuel efficiency.159 
Finding support for overlapping statutory obligations, the court moved to 
address the question of what mechanism should resolve inconsistencies 
between the two regulatory schemes.160  While the AIAM maintained that the 
EPA must assure harmonization with the DOT of any new regulations that 
impinge on existing CAFE standards, the court found no support in the 
statutory language of the CAA for such a position.161  Examination of the 
structure and text of the EPCA and CAA instead evidenced Congress’s intent 
to allocate the EPA with the broader authority—that of regulating vehicle 
emissions involving the important purpose of insuring public health and 
welfare.162  The fact that the EPA must evaluate the risk motor vehicle 
greenhouse gases pose on public health and welfare—and the mandate to 
regulate, if such endangerment is found—further bolstered this reading.163 
The EPCA’s language also supported this conclusion.164  When 
establishing CAFE standards the Secretary of Transportation must consider 
“technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor 
vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the 
United States to conserve energy.”165  The CAA, alternatively, gives the EPA 
no corresponding statutory duty to give consideration to the EPCA’s regulatory 
scheme.166 The court found this asymmetrical allocation indicative of 
congressional intent that the DOT, through the NHTSA, must conform its 
CAFE program to the EPA’s determination of what regulatory level is 
necessary to protect public health and welfare.167 
If any doubt still lingered, the court further noted how the factors the EPA 
must consider in discharging their duty overlap with the factors the NHTSA 
must consider in discharging theirs.168  In preparing emissions reductions, the 
EPA is instructed to “give appropriate consideration” to factors including the 
achievable level of emissions reductions through available cost, energy, and 
 
to promulgate emissions control regulations for the protection of public health and welfare 
notwithstanding the potential effect of those regulations on average fleet fuel economy standards 
determined under EPCA.”). 
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safety factors associated with the application of the emissions reduction 
technology.169  The comparable EPCA language, again, requires instead that 
the Secretary “shall consider. . . .”170  The court read this to indicate that while 
Congress did not empower the NHTSA to consider the impact mileage 
standards would have on public health and welfare, they did empower the 
NHTSA to consider “other motor vehicle standards of the government,”171 
enabling the NHTSA to conform their mileage standards with the reduction the 
EPA finds necessary for the protection of public health and welfare.172  The 
court found any other conclusion nonsensical, finding instead that: 
Given the level of impairment of human health and welfare that current climate 
science indicates may occur if human-generated greenhouse gas emissions 
continue unabated, it would be the very definition of folly if [the] EPA were 
precluded from action simply because the level of decrease in greenhouse gas 
output is incompatible with existing mileage standards under EPCA.173 
Lastly, the court considered the status of state regulations granted an EPA 
waiver.174  Given the conclusion that the EPA may promulgate conflicting 
regulations so long as they are directed at public health and welfare, the court 
framed the issue as whether a state regulation granted a CAA waiver should 
stand in any different stead with respect to inconsistencies it may have with the 
EPCA fuel efficiency standards.175  As previously indicated, the EPA is 
obliged to grant a waiver application for California regulations if the 
regulations meet the three requirements contained under section 209.176  
California regulations that have been granted an EPA waiver additionally serve 
as “other laws of the Government” that must be considered by the NHTSA in 
formulating the EPCA average fleet mileage standards.177  In Central Valley, 
however, AIAM contended that the extent of consideration the NHTSA must 
give to California’s regulations amounted only to a determination that it has a 
de minimis effect on fuel efficiency.178  If the NHTSA found that the California 
regulations had more than a de minimis effect on fuel efficiency, they argued 
that the regulation should be preempted.179 
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The court found Green Mountain Chrysler convincing on this issue, calling 
it “[t]he most thorough and persuasive analysis of the issue so far as the court 
has found.”180  There the court looked to the EPCA section 502(d), which 
provided that any manufacturer could apply to the DOT for modification of a 
CAFE standard if it could show the existence of a “federal standards fuel 
economy reduction,” defined as including the EPA-approved California 
emissions standards.181  The court in Central Valley found this language 
persuasive to indicate that when the EPCA was adopted in 1975, Congress 
“unequivocally stated that federal standards included EPA-approved California 
emissions standards.”182  Additionally, as discussed in Green Mountain 
Chrysler, the EPCA’s legislative history supports the conclusion that 
regulations promulgated by California and granted waiver status under section 
209 are “other motor vehicle standards” that the NHTSA must consider in 
setting fuel economy standards.183  In sum, Central Valley held that just as in 
Massachusetts, where the EPA’s CAA duty to regulate GHG emissions 
overlapped with but did not conflict with the DOT’s duty to set fuel efficiency 
standards.  Likewise California’s AB 1493 efforts to regulate GHG emissions 
through the CAA waiver overlap, but do not conflict with the DOT’s 
responsibility under the EPCA.184 
The Central Valley decision was regarded by commentators as further 
judicial affirmation in favor of state regulation, representing a “judicial 
recognition of global warming as more than just a political issue.”185 
VI.  ANALYSIS—A MARKED SHIFT IN JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE GLOBAL 
WARMING ISSUE 
At a fundamental level, Massachusetts has been regarded by commentators 
as helping to create a common-sense discourse about global warming.186  
Indeed, some have opined that the Court’s decision will have the effect of 
requiring an Executive Branch, specifically the Bush administration, that has 
repeatedly denied a causal connection between human activity and global 
warming to abandon its unilateral position.187  Others have further argued that 
the Court’s decision has the significance of vindicating “the individuals, 
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industries, organizations, and state and local governments that have been 
pushing for global warming regulation all along.”188 
Yet, while these conclusions are certainly true, the Massachusetts decision 
also seems to reflect an interpretive shift by the Court, and one that has the 
potential for more hospitable judicial assessment of future preemption 
challenges.  While the Court has previously utilized an analysis looking solely 
to the plain meaning of statutory language to decipher congressional intent, 
Massachusetts appears to shift the emphasis instead to the purpose behind 
regulatory enactments.  By looking instead to the legislative history and 
purpose behind environmental legislation such as the CAA and EPCA, state 
attempts such as those at issue in Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley 
arguably stand a better chance of success on appeal. 
A. Reconsidering Engine Manufacturers and “Plain Meaning” as 
Dispositive of Congressional Intent 
Perhaps analogy provides the most apt way to demonstrate this seeming 
judicial shift from plain meaning to more thorough statutory analysis (and 
more hospitable view of state regulatory attempts). Prior to the Supreme 
Court’s Massachusetts decision, its last foray into CAA preemption was in 
Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Quality Management. 
District.189  In Engine Manufacturers, the Court, in an opinion authored by 
Justice Scalia, held that California fleet rules prohibiting the purchase of 
vehicles not meeting stringent emissions standards were preempted under the 
CAA.190  At issue was the scope of the word “standard” in section 209(a) of 
the CAA, which provides that: “[n]o [s]tate or any political subdivision thereof 
shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of 
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to 
this part.”191  The district court granted summary judgment for South Coast, 
holding that the fleet rules were not “standards” within the meaning of section 
209(a), because they regulated only the purchase of vehicles otherwise 
available for sale in California.192  Where fleet rules did not compel 
manufacturers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affected the purchase 
of vehicles, the district court held that such a regulation was not a 
“standard.”193 
 
 188. Id. at 178. 
 189. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004) 
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The Supreme Court instead found that the preemptive effect of section 
209(a) was not limited to sales restrictions.194  Justice Scalia began by finding 
that the ordinary meaning of congressional language normally expresses 
legislative purpose.195 Looking to Webster’s Second New International 
Dictionary, Justice Scalia defined “standard” as “that which is established by 
authority, custom, or general consent, as a model or example; criterion; 
test.”196  Applying this definition to section 209(a), the majority found that the 
criteria referred to in section 209 related to the emission characteristics of a 
vehicle, an interpretation consistent with the use of “standard” throughout the 
CAA.197 
Similarly, the majority found that the district court’s distinction between 
purchase restrictions and sale restrictions confused standards with the means 
for enforcing standards.198  Section 202 of the CAA, the Court found, set a 
standard, where later sections 203–206 provided methods to enforce such a 
standard.199  Use of the term in other portions of the CAA thus demonstrated 
that Congress contemplated the enforcement of emission standards through 
purchase requirements.200 The Court again found support for this reading 
through the use of the word “standard” in another portion of the CAA.201  
Indeed, section 246 of the CAA required state-adopted and federally-approved 
“restrictions on the purchase of fleet vehicles to meet clean-air standards.”202  
From this statutory analysis the Court concluded that Congress contemplated 
emissions standard enforcement through purchase requirements.203 
Finally, the majority maintained that allowing purchase restrictions would 
in effect undermine and undo the carefully calibrated regulatory scheme 
envisioned by Congress,204 reasoning that although the fleet rules covered only 
certain purchasers (and thus do not eliminate all demand for covered vehicles), 
allowing one state to enact rules would lead others to do the same.205  In 
declining to read into section 209(a) a purchase/sale distinction absent from the 
text or structure of the CAA, the Court found that “[a] command, accompanied 
by sanctions, that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular 
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emission characteristics is as much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’ as a 
command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a 
manufacturer’s sales volume must consist of such vehicles.”206 
Justice Souter, the only dissenting justice, authored an opinion challenging 
the majority for failing to recognize the presumption against preemption, as 
well as the legislative history and purpose behind the CAA.207  He began by 
articulating the practical consequence of the Court’s holding, noting that it 
“prohibits one of the most polluted regions in the United States from requiring 
private fleet operators to buy clean engines that are readily available on the 
commercial market.”208  Justice Souter further questioned the majority for not 
adhering to the presumption that where Congress legislates in a field 
traditionally occupied by the states, a federal act can supersede the state’s 
historic police powers only by demonstrating clear and manifest congressional 
purpose to do so.209  He thus argued that the presumption should be applied, 
given the CAA’s recognition that “the prevention and control of air pollution at 
its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.”210 
Justice Souter similarly found that the legislative history behind the 
preemption provision demonstrated that Congress’s purpose was to stop states 
from imposing regulatory requirements directly limiting what manufacturers 
could sell.211  In light of such purpose, section 209(a) had no preemptive 
application to the fleet rules.212  Further, while recognizing that a law 
prohibiting any purchase of any vehicle failing to meet new state-specific 
emissions criteria would have the same effect as direct manufacturer 
regulation—and would thus be preempted under section 209(a)—Justice 
Souter found that such was not the case here given that the fleet rules required 
purchase of cleaner engines only if they were already commercially 
available.213 
Reaction to the Engine Manufacturers decision painted the case as 
internally inconsistent and as a departure from traditional methods of statutory 
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interpretation.214 Indeed, by finding the plain meaning of “standard” 
unambiguous—and thus categorically preemptive—the Court in effect 
invalidated fleet rules that were otherwise in agreement with the purpose of the 
CAA’s section 209(a) preemption provision, and in harmony with the primary 
goal behind the CAA.215 
B. Squaring Engine Manufacturers with Massachusetts 
Comparing Justice Scalia’s Engine Manufacturers decision with the 
majority decision in Massachusetts illustrates not only an interpretive analysis 
more consistent with the underlying purpose of the CAA, but further shows 
how a majority of the Court has shifted toward a more thorough statutory 
analysis (and incidentally a more hospitable view toward environmental 
preemption questions). While not addressing the question of preemption, 
Massachusetts did require the Court to examine the statutory text of the CAA 
to determine whether the EPA had authority under the Act to regulate carbon 
dioxide emissions from automobiles.216  The language at issue provided that: 
[T]he EPA administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable 
to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor 
vehicles . . . which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. . . .217 
As stated above, the Court found initial support for a broad view of the 
EPA’s authority in the CAA’s expansive definition of “any air pollutant.”218  
Significantly, though, the Court went further than the statutory text in 
challenging the EPA’s position that post-enactment congressional actions 
functioned as tantamount to congressional commands to refrain from 
regulation.219  That later Congresses abstained from enacting binding 
emissions limitations to address global warming did nothing to inform 
congressional intent regarding the CAA amendments.220  Instead, the Court 
found that various congressional efforts to promote inter-agency climate 
change collaboration and research supported and complemented the textual 
mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” determined to endanger public 
welfare.221 
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In analyzing the EPA’s argument that regulation of automobile emissions 
would require it to encroach on the DOT’s statutory mandate, the Court 
likewise looked beyond the text of section 202(a)(1) to the underlying purpose 
behind the CAA.222  Finding that the CAA charged the EPA with protecting 
the public health and welfare, the Court concluded that overlap in the DOT’s 
mandate in no way licensed the EPA to “shirk its environmental 
responsibilities.”223  Examination of congressional history likewise aided the 
conclusion that “[w]hile the Congresses that drafted §202(a)(1) might not have 
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global 
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing 
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the CAA 
obsolete.”224 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Massachusetts further demonstrates the way in 
which the majority has shifted away from the Engine Manufacturers plain 
meaning construction toward an inquiry utilizing legislative history and 
congressional purpose.  Addressing the EPA’s authority, Justice Scalia takes 
issue with the majority’s determination that carbon dioxide qualifies as an “air 
pollutant” under section 202(a)(1).225  While agreeing that greenhouse gases fit 
within the second half of the CAA definition, he disagrees with the majority 
for failing to acknowledge the first half of the definition, requiring it first be an 
“air pollution agent or combination of such agents.”226  The EPA instead 
argued that a substance “does not meet the CAA definition of air pollutant 
simply because it is a physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is 
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.  It must also be an air 
pollution agent.”227  On this equally plausible statutory reading, Justice Scalia 
urged application of Chevron deference to the EPA in light of this textual 
ambiguity, and criticized the majority for failing to explain why such deference 
was not due.228 
Further, Justice Scalia looked to Webster’s New International Dictionary 
for confirmation that the EPA’s interpretation of “air pollution” was 
reasonable.229  There he found “pollute” defined as “[t]o make or render 
impure or unclean,” and “air” defined as: (1) “[t]he invisible, odorless, and 
tasteless mixture of gases which surrounds the earth”; (2) “[t]he body of the 
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earth’s atmosphere; esp., the part of it near the earth, as distinguished from the 
upper rarefied part”; (3) “[a] portion of air or of the air considered with respect 
to physical characteristics or as affecting the senses.”230  Given this definition, 
Justice Scalia found the EPA’s interpretation of air pollution to include 
impurities in the ambient air “at ground level or near the surface of the earth” 
entirely consistent with the terms natural meaning.231 As in Engine 
Manufacturers, Justice Scalia’s analysis saw no need to move beyond the plain 
language of section 202(a)(1), and offered no examination of the legislative 
history surrounding the CAA provision. Justice Stevens addressed this 
criticism in the majority opinion, when he stated that: 
Justice Scalia maintains that because greenhouse gases permeate the world’s 
atmosphere rather than a limited area near the earth’s surface, [the] EPA’s 
exclusion of greenhouse gases from the category of air pollution “agent[s]” is 
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. . . .  [The] EPA’s distinction, however, finds no support in the 
text of the statute, which uses the phrase “the ambient air” without 
distinguishing between atmospheric layers. Moreover, it is a plainly 
unreasonable reading of a sweeping statutory provision designed to capture 
any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or 
otherwise enters the ambient air.  Justice Scalia does not (and cannot) explain 
why Congress would define “air pollutant” so carefully and so broadly, yet 
confer on [the] EPA the authority to narrow that definition whenever expedient 
by asserting that a particular substance is not an “agent.” At any rate, no party 
to this dispute contests that greenhouse gases both “ente[r] the ambient air” 
and tend to warm the atmosphere. They are therefore unquestionably 
“agent[s]” of air pollution.232 
Seemingly then, Justice Scalia’s failure to look beyond the plain meaning 
of statutory language in Massachusetts, as in Engine Manufacturers, resulted 
again in an outcome at odds with the primary purpose behind the CAA.233  Of 
importance for current discussion, however, is the fact that while Justice 
Scalia’s Engine Manufacturers decision was on behalf of a majority of eight 
justices, his dissent in Massachusetts now only garners the support of his three 
most conservative colleagues. 
Indeed, Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Engine Manufacturers 
articulates the interpretive analysis that Justice Stevens’ majority opinion 
employs in Massachusetts.  In challenging the majority’s preemption holding 
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in Engine Manufacturers, Justice Souter looked beyond the plain language of 
section 209(a) to find that the presumption against preemption was evident 
from CAA section 101 language stating that “air pollution control at its source 
is the primary responsibility of the States and local governments.”234 
Furthermore, where the majority stopped at the plain meaning of 
“standard” viewed in light of a dictionary definition, Justice Souter examined 
legislative history to determine that Congress’s purpose in passing the 
preemption provision was meant only to stop state attempts at imposing 
regulatory requirements that directly limited what manufacturers were able to 
sell.235 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Judicial resolution of the statutory conflict between the CAA and EPCA 
will have great importance in the coming years as more and more states 
continue to recognize the significant dilemma that climate change poses 
globally, and as they seek to take an active role in limiting their own GHG 
emissions.  The Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts seems to indicate a 
shift in the Court’s view regarding environmental regulatory preemption, a 
new judicial awareness of the real threat global warming poses, a more 
thorough statutory analysis, and likely a more hospitable outcome for CARB 
and other state litigants seeking to defend their regulatory attempts against 
industry preemption challenges.  While it remains unclear whether the Court 
will employ the presumption against preemption in future litigation, the 
Massachusetts Court’s endorsement of piecemeal regulatory efforts to combat 
global warming, coupled with the thorough justification for non-conflicting 
overlap provided by Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley, present a 
persuasive foundation for the Court to side with states’ rights. 
*AUTHOR’S NOTE 
Since the writing of this note the EPA has, for the first time, denied 
outright California’s waiver request to regulate GHG automobile emissions.236  
The EPA administrator Stephen Johnson maintains that an energy bill recently 
signed by President Bush represents a “clear national solution” more preferable 
than the “confusing patchwork of state rules” he alleges the current regulatory 
system provides.237  As of January 2, 2008, California has brought suit against 
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the EPA, challenging the agency’s waiver denial.238  California maintains that 
the agency “had no legal or technical justification for blocking the new 
standards.”239  This latest development typifies the tempestuous relationship 
between an administration obstinate about federal regulatory control and those 
states pushing for more responsible greenhouse gas regulation. 
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